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Recent Developments
Convergence between
Australian common law and
English common law: The
rule against penalties in the
age of freedom of contract
Man Yip1 and Yihan Goh1
Abstract
This note discusses the High Court of Australia decision of Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand
Bank Group Limited on the rule against penalty clauses and situates its importance in light of the
UK Supreme Court decision of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi and Beavis v
ParkingEye Ltd. It compares the analytical frameworks laid down in the two cases and points out
some unresolved issues in this area of law even following these cases.
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Introduction
As French CJ observed in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Bank Group Limited,1
‘[t]here has been much activity’ concerning the contractual rule against penalties (the ‘penalty
rule’) within the common law world. The first major development occurred in Andrews v
Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,2 where the High Court of Australia extended
the penalty rule to cover contractual provisions triggered other than by breach. However, the
UK Supreme Court, in the subsequent joint appeals of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El
Makdessi and Beavis v ParkingEye Ltd,3 declined to follow this Australian development.4 It
confirmed that the English penalty rule would only apply to secondary obligations (the breach
limitation). But Australian law and English law did not continue on divergent paths. While the
expanded ambit established in Andrews was retained in Paciocco,5 the High Court of
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Australia’s renewed approach in determining whether a provision is a penalty is in agreement
with the UK Supreme Court’s approach in Cavendish, that is, a clause will be struck down as a
penalty if the stipulated consequences are entirely ‘out of proportion’ with the interests of the
party seeking to rely on the clause. The highly anticipated Paciocco judgement therefore
confirms that Australian law, converging with English law, treats the modern penalty rule as an
exception to the principle of party autonomy and is to be restrictively applied. This com-
mentary focuses on the common law penalty rule, in particular, by comparing the Australian
development with the English position.
Facts and holding
Paciocco concerned the enforceability of late payment fees for consumer credit card accounts.
Such fees are typically charged if the required payable amount remains outstanding by a
specified date. In other words, the late payment fee provisions were triggered by breach of
contract, thereby falling within the traditional scope of the penalty rule. In Paciocco, Mr
Paciocco, head of the representative proceedings, argued that such late payment fees charged
by the bank were penalties. Alternatively, he argued that the charging of the late payment fees
contravened various Australian legislative provisions.6
Gordon J, the judge at first instance, held that the late payment fees were penalties. In
determining whether the fees were extravagant, she took the view that the only relevant losses
suffered by the bank from late payments were the direct costs spent on recovering those pay-
ments.7 She rejected the bank’s expert evidence that the bank also incurred other losses, such as
loss provision costs and regulatory capital costs. These costs in her view were part of the costs of
operating a bank in Australia and thus irrelevant to an assessment of the bank’s damage in the
event of late payment. Accordingly, she found that the late payment fees far exceeded the
damages that the bank could legitimately recover had it sued for breach of the obligation to repay
by the specified date. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court, taking a wider view of the
losses that the bank would suffer arising from late payments, overruled Gordon J’s decision on
late payment fees.8 The Full Court held that the test to determine if a stipulated sum was a penalty
was whether that sum was commensurate with the interest to be protected. Applying that test, and
having taken a wider view of what would count as relevant losses/costs to the bank, the Full Court
concluded that the late payment fees were not extravagant and hence not penalties.9
The majority of the High Court (consisting of French CJ, Kiefel, Gaegler and Keane JJ)
dismissed the appeal on both the common law penalty rule as well as the statutory claims. On
the common law penalty rule, agreeing with the Full Court, the High Court affirmed that the
bank had an interest in the timely repayment of credit and that late payments would damage it
in respect of operational costs, loss provisioning and increases in regulatory capital costs.
Based on the evidence of the bank’s expert, which addressed these categories of losses, the
High Court concluded that the late payment fees imposed were not out of all proportion to the
bank’s financial interests. Indeed, Keane J considered it difficult to treat the purpose behind
such late payment fees as to punish customers. Instead, he considered that late payment fees
could constitute a stream of revenue for the bank, similar to how it charged similar fees from
other facilities available to customers.
In reaching this conclusion, themajority engaged in a lengthy discussion on the legal principles.
The principles enunciated by the House of Lords inDunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd vNewGarage
and Motor Co Ltd10 and by the High Court in Andrews continue to be good law in Australia,
although Lord Dunedin’s famous ‘tests’11 in Dunlop Pneumatic require a reconsideration in
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modern times. Consistent with the views of Lords Neuberger and Sumption (with whom Lord
Carnwath agreed) inCavendish,12Kiefel, Gageler andKeane JJ,writing separately, clarified13 that
LordDunedin’s tests are to be treated as a guide, as opposed to rules for determining if a stipulation
is a penalty. Itwas emphasized that LordDunedin’s testswere developed based on the language14
and wisdom of the time, but that the modern understanding of economic reality and financial
risks borne by a bank as a result of late payments by customers is markedly different.15 Kiefel J
pointed out that the unarticulated policy underlying these tests is that a summay not be charged
upon breach if the purpose and effect of its provision is to threaten or punish the defaulting
party. The pertinent question is whether the provision is ‘out of all proportion’16 to the
innocent party’s commercial interests, and those interests may go beyond seeking compen-
sation for loss. In this connection, the majority stressed the importance of freedom of contract
in the contemporary application of the penalty rule: that is, the courts will not lightly find a
contractual provision to be unenforceable as a penalty.17
Dissenting, Nettle J held that the late payment fees were penalties because there was no
evidence that the bank had any other interest to be protected by the timely payment of out-
standing sums by its customers, save for the avoidance of costs. He was of the view18 that the
present case was a straightforward one to which Lord Dunedin’s test 4(c) that: ‘there is a
presumption that a single lump sum is a penalty if it is payable on the occurrence of one or more
of the several events of which some may occasion serious damage and others do not’ could be
applied. In addition, Nettle J preferred Gordon J’s narrow view of the bank’s losses in the
determination of whether a clause is penal. He rejected the bank’s expert evidence as being
relevant to rebutting the presumption because it presented projections of potential costs that
were not actually incurred.19
The Australian penalty rule after Paciocco: Convergence
and divergence with English law
Analytical framework
Following Paciocco, the analytical framework of the penalty rule under Australian law is a
two-stage process. At the threshold stage, the court needs to decide whether the disputed
provision attracts the application of the penalty rule. Post-Andrews, this essentially involves the
court distinguishing between a ‘collateral stipulation’ that imposes an additional detriment and
an ‘alternative stipulation’ that provides for ‘further accommodation’.20 The former stipulation
engages the penalty rule but not the latter. The second stage of the analysis, post-Paciocco,
requires the court to decide whether the provision is a penalty by considering whether the
stipulated consequences are out of all proportion to the legitimate commercial interests of the
party seeking to rely on it. A party’s commercial interests are to be determined by considering
the wider background of the transaction.
The Australian framework bears some similarities to the two-stage English framework post-
Cavendish. Under English law, the threshold stage similarly considers whether a clause falls
within the scope of the penalty rule but the distinction is to be drawn between a primary
obligation and a secondary obligation.21 English law continues to apply the breach limitation to
its penalty rule. On determining that a provision is a penalty, the second stage of the English
framework asks whether the secondary obligation is clearly excessive in relation to the inno-
cent party’s legitimate interest. This corresponds largely to the second stage of the Australian
framework. Notwithstanding the more expansive scope of the Australian rule, the
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enforceability of a clause will be controlled by the second stage under both the English and
Australian approaches. The difference between them is that a broader range of clauses would
bring the Australian penalty rule into play, even though the Australian approach is unlikely to
produce a different outcome from the English approach in many cases.
Whether the Australian or English first stage of analysis (that is, the distinction between col-
lateral/alternative stipulations and that between primary/secondary obligations) is more appro-
priate is best left for detailed discussiononadifferent occasion.What shouldbenoted is that neither
distinction, determined by way of contractual construction, is easy to draw in practice. The dif-
ficulty of the English exercise is amply illustrated by the ambivalence of views of the various
SupremeCourt Justices inCavendishas towhether the clause in theMakdessi appealwas a primary
or secondary obligation. The collateral alternative distinctionunder theAustralian framework is no
less straightforward. An example of an alternative stipulation given by the High Court inAndrews
was thedisputedprovision inMetro-Goldwyn-MayerPtyLtdvGreenham.22That case concerned a
contract for the hiring of films to exhibitors for public showing pursuant towhich the exhibitor was
entitled to one showing at a particular time. The contract further prescribed a fee four times the
original fee for each additional showing. Such a stipulation is to be characterized as ‘alternative’
and would not engage the Australian penalty rule. Nevertheless, the complexity of modern
transactions matched by the complexity of contractual drafting would render this an exercise of
construction,which is equally requiredby theAustralian collateral alternative distinction, vigorous
and challenging. As Peel commented, the Australian approach has simply moved ‘some of the
problems associated with the breach limitation to a different place’ (Peel, 2013: 155).
Freedom of contract
More explicitly than Cavendish, Paciocco affirmed the importance of freedom of contract.
The principle of freedom of contract circumscribes the application of the penalty rule in
both jurisdictions. This form of party autonomy is, however, subservient to other more
important social values (Worthington, 2016) when the penalty rule is invoked, most
notably, safeguarding against certain forms of inequality of bargaining power and
impropriety in contracting. The alternative statutory claims in the ParkingEye appeal in
Cavendish (concerning parking charges) as well as Paciocco are telling as to how these
values are upheld in contemporary law and society. Legislation, aimed at specific forms of
unacceptable conduct or terms in certain kinds of contracts, such as the Unfair Contract
Terms Act has done with respect to consumer contracts, has assumed the paternalistic role
and provided greater precision than the blunt common law rule which was historically
developed to regulate a specific kind of transaction, the penal bond.23 Indeed, the common
law now plays a subsidiary, supporting role: chiefly, to operate where legislation has not
intervened.24 Therefore, neither English law nor Australian law has opted for the abolition
of the penalty rule. Importantly, the precise interplay between statute and common law in
a particular jurisdiction will determine the form that its penalty rule takes as well as future
incremental development, notwithstanding the common English origin. For this reason,
French CJ said in Paciocco that ‘[i]t may be that in this country statutory law reform
offers more promise than debates about the true reading of English legal history’.25
Yet, how is one to explain the expansion of scope of the Australian penalty rule in Andrews,
in disregard of the endorsement of ‘freedom of contract’ in earlier cases?26 On this, one must
not forget Gummow J (a well-known non-fusionist) had contributed to the joint judgement in
Andrews—an erudite lesson on English legal history—which affirmed that the penalty rule,
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originating from equity, did not impose a breach precondition and that this equitable version
continues to exist today.27 Paciocco did not challenge this broadened scope but it did, quite
rightly in our view, limit the practical reach of the penalty rule.
Out of all proportion: Commercial interests, losses and economic reality
Overall, Paciocco, compared with Cavendish, offers less guidance on how the court is to
determine whether the stipulated consequences are out of all proportion to the commercial
interests of the party seeking to rely upon the contractual provision. What the majority in
Paciocco has said is that the exercise involves a quantitative aspect. The late payment fee was
charged either at AUD 35 or AUD 20, which was well below the figures assessed by the bank’s
expert having regard to the provisioning costs, regulatory capital costs and operational costs that
could potentially be incurred by the bank in the event of late payment. What is unclear is whether
the Australian measuring exercise is only or largely concerned with numbers and nothing else.
One matter merits some attention. Keane J briefly mentioned that Mr Paciocco in the case had
‘freely risked incurring the late payment fee as a matter of his own convenience’.28 Keane J
reasoned that it could thus be inferred that the late payment fee charged in the particular com-
mercial context was ‘an acceptable cost of avoiding the expense and inconvenience of meeting
his obligations as to timely payment of his account’—an inference that militated against a finding
that the late payment fee was penal in effect. Nevertheless, that one customer could choose to
freely risk incurring the fee is not itself indicative that the cost is objectively reasonable or
acceptable, for another customer with insubstantial means might not have the luxury of choice.
In Cavendish, on the other hand, the Supreme Court highlighted factors such as reasonable
notice of the allegedly penal term, difference in bargaining power between the parties, whether
legal advice was obtained prior to the entry into the contract and whether the innocent party’s
legitimate interests had been made known to the other party at the time of contracting. The
High Court in Paciocco did not explicitly discuss any of these factors. One cannot therefore
assume that these factors are relevant under the Australian test. The Australian out of all
proportion test emerged in a dispute that also raised multiple statutory claims which more
directly address these other concerns. As discussed above, the legislative backdrop, which
necessarily differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, has a decisive influence on the development
of common law principles in this day and age. Accordingly, factors formulated in a different
jurisdiction should not be transposed without question into another jurisdiction. It may also be
that the quantitative measurement was more than sufficient to dispose of the appeal. Yet, it
remains to be seen if the Australian penalty rule would in future developments consider
qualitative factors directed at the quality of consent, such as the difference in bargaining power
or coercive conduct at the time of contracting.
Practically, what Paciocco does usefully explain is how banks may legitimately price for
lending, by reference to the categories of losses which the majority affirmed as relevant in the
determination of whether the late payment fee provisions were penalties. In short, a bank is not
limited to a genuine pre-estimate of its losses arising from the customer’s breach when it con-
tractually stipulates for a sum to be charged for late repayment. Indeed, Keane J explicitly
acknowledged that one of the bank’s legitimate interests is profitable lending on the basis of
timeous repayment by its customers, which would be different from profitable lending on the
basis of late repayment.29 The bank is thus entitled to charge for more than what it could recover
as damages for breach of contract. Gageler J said, in a similar vein, that the bank ‘was not
confined by a principle of law to adopting a pricing strategy for its credit card products which
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involved cross-subsidisation’.30 The ‘business for profit’ consideration also featured in Lord
Mance’s analysis in the ParkingEye appeal. He commented that one relevant consideration was
that the specialist car park operator in the case, who imposed a parking charge on overstaying
motorists, had to profit from its endeavour beyond recovering its costs of operation.31
At their core, Paciocco andCavendish indicate judicial acknowledgement that courts are not
best placed to measure the impact non-observance of contractual obligations has on businesses.
The investigation into the wider commercial interests and the out of all proportion test (as
opposed to requiring mere disproportionality) are avenues through which the courts can
flexibly grapple with the commercial reality and effect a more practically relevant value
judgement on the issue of enforceability. As a matter of law, while Dunlop Pneumatic remains
good law in the sense of providing guiding considerations, it does not appear that there will be
many simple and straightforward cases to which Lord Dunedin’s tests can be directly applied.
The ParkingEye appeals in Cavendish concerning parking charges imposed on motorists who
overstayed the free 2-h maximum stay came the closest to being a simple and straightforward
case. And yet, the Supreme Court in Cavendish did not apply Lord Dunedin’s tests directly in
reaching its conclusion. Keane J in Paciocco agreed with the Supreme Court’s reasoning;32
none of the other High Court Justices objected to the outcome.
Unresolved issues
Finally, there are two unresolved issues of practical importance under Australian law. First, in
Cavendish, Lords Mance and Hodge said that a contracting party’s legitimate interests are not
limited to commercial interests.33 In Paciocco, however, the majority of the High Court had
described a contracting party’s legitimate interests as being of ‘commercial’, ‘business’ or
‘financial’ nature.34 It has been argued elsewhere that legitimate non-commercial interests may
include an interest in national security such as was found in AG v Blake,35 a case on account of
profits for breach of contract. In Blake, a double agent who published a book on his secret
services work was sued by the Crown for the profits he had earned from the publication. The
House of Lords awarded an account of profits, which is available exceptionally for breach of
contract, on the basis that compensation for losses suffered by the Crown would not be sufficient
in the case to protect the Crown’s legitimate interest of ensuring that secret service could operate
in complete confidence for national security concerns. We see no reason why such a kind of non-
commercial interest cannot justify the stipulation of consequences by contract that go beyond
compensation for loss. Importantly, there are many non-commercial contracts which contain
stipulations designed to deter breach of contract that may be challenged as penalties.
Secondly, a point that has yet to be considered by the Australian and English courts alike is
whether provisions that stipulate for consequences in respect of the same event (e.g. breach)
could cumulatively be regarded as penal and unenforceable, even though each considered
individually is not out of all proportion to the legitimate interests of the party seeking to rely on
them. It is arguable that the court should take into account the cumulative effect of provisions,
especially in a case where the provisions are being invoked together, thereby intensifying the
ultimate impact. A resolution of this issue will have an important bearing on drafting practice.
Conclusion
In closing, it might be worth noting that other common law courts have begun to deal with the
implications of Cavendish. For example, in the recent Singapore High Court decision of
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iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon,36 George Wei J acknowledged the pending
importance of Cavendish in Singapore law. Subsequently, in the Singapore High Court case of
Allplus Holdings Pte Ltd v Phoon Wui Nyen (Pan Weiyuan),37 Foo Tuat Yien JC applied the
distinction drawn in Cavendish between primary and secondary obligations. As such, the
refinement of the penalty rule in Australia and England will impact the rest of the common law
world, even as those jurisdictions also strive to formulate the penalty rule in a form consistent
with their unique situations.
The development of the rule against penalties cannot escape from generalized statements that
the interest should to be protected is ‘legitimate’ or that the financial repercussions are not out of
all proportion. In the end, however, the proper test is framed, the key to understanding the penalty
rule is its central purpose in balancing the parties’ freedom to protect their interests contractually,
and the law’s residual interest in ensuring that that freedom is not exercised improperly. While
there will be a degree of value judgement in assessing what is or is not proper, that perhaps is the
best approach to take in an area underlined by commercial realities and pragmatism.
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Notes
1. [2016] HCA 28 at [10] (Paciocco).
2. [2012] 247 CLR 205 (Andrews).
3. [2015] 3 WLR 1373 (Cavendish).
4. Cf. Peel (2013); Davies and Turner (2013).
5. Above n. 1.
6. Various statutory claims were brought against the bank: (a) for engaging in unconscionable conduct
under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act
1999 (Victoria); (b) the contracts were unjust transactions under the National Credit Code; and (c) the
late payment fee provisions were unfair terms under the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Victoria).
7. Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2014] 309 ALR 249.
8. Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] 236 FCR 199.
9. Gordon J heard statutory claims mounted in respect of other fees charged by the bank. For complete-
ness, it should also be mentioned that the Full Court dismissed the statutory claims, which were not
brought before Gordon J.
10. [1915] AC 79 (Dunlop Pneumatic).
11. Ibid. at 86–87.
12. Above n. 3 at [22].
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13. Above n. 1 at [30]–[41] (per Kiefel J, with whom French CJ agreed); at [141]–[151] (per Gageler J);
at [260]–[270] (per Keane J).
14. Ibid. at [32] (per Kiefel J).
15. Ibid. at [264] (per Keane J).
16. Ibid. at [54] and [68] (per Kiefel J) and at [256] (per Keane J); at [173] (per Gageler J) was of the same
view, although he used the language of ‘grossly disproportionate’.
17. Ibid. at [54] (per Kiefel J); at [156] (per Gageler J); at [220]–[221] and [251] (per Keane J).
18. Ibid. at [322] and [348].
19. Ibid. at [349].
20. Above n. 2 at [10] and [79]–[80].
21. For a discussion of the chief problems with the primary–secondary obligation distinction, see Harder
(2013).
22. [1966] 2 NSWLR 717.
23. Simpson (1966). Another example is the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Office of Fair Trading
v Abbey National plc [2009] All ER (D) 271 that overdraft charges formed the basis of providing
other customers with free current account facilities. Although the case was not decided by the
application of the penalty rule, and turned on a technical issue regarding the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations, there was no doubt that the penalty rule was potentially relevant.
We would like to thank Professor Keith Stanton for bringing this point to our attention.
24. Above n. 3 at [38] (per Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath); at [167] (per Lord
Mance); at [260] (per Lord Hodge).
25. Above n. 1 at [10].
26. See, for example, Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2005] 224 CLR 645 at 669.
27. See a searing analysis of Andrews by Carter et al. (2013).
28. Above n. 1 at [267].
29. Ibid. at [278].
30. Ibid. at [172].
31. Above n. 1 at [198].
32. Ibid. at [266]–[267].
33. Above n. 3 at [162] (per Lord Mance) and at [256] (per Lord Hodge).
34. Above n. 1 at [29] and [35] (per Kiefel J); at [172]–[173] (per Gageler J); at [256] (per Keane J).
35. [2001] 1 AC 268.
36. [2016] 3 SLR 663.
37. [2016] SGHC 144.
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